corresponding notes in Appendix) to the doctrine expounded in these sections. Dr. Mansel very properly replies that his " responsibility for the theory in question was limited to quoting with approbation the language of a contemporary writer." —(Second Letter to Professor Goldwin Smith, p. 68.) Neither of the Oxford Professors deigns to name this treatise, nor is there any evidence that either had read or pondered the exposition which it contains of that view of Providence which both so scornfully reject. Mr. Powell does nothing more than scoff at the " absurd kind of jealousy of physical science shown by certain writers." The scoff cannot apply to this work, where such pains have been taken to show that law reigns so universally in physical natiu*e—it should be added, pains being also taken to establish a very different religious doctrine from that of Mr. Powell, who seems to identify " physical order " with [illegible] reason and mind," and with God himself. Professor G. Smith refers to a certain school of religious philosophers, who " appear to cling to the last remnant of the arbitrary and marvellous in nature as though it were the last stronghold of religion." This language is equally inapplicable to this treatise, in which we have laboured to show that God is to be seen iu those general Jaws which are the expression of his wisdom. He urges, first, that the weather, "though variable in England, is comparatively stable on the continent, and still more stable between the tropics," and, secondly, he calls us to notice in how awkward a position we should be, provided the " meteorological observations winch are now going on should result in the reduction of the weather to general laws." Mr. G. Smith is a very clever man ; but his judgments would be sounder provided he gave a more careful consideration to the subjects on which he ventures to pronounce an opinion. If he had looked into the work to which Dr. Mansel expressly refers as containing the view criticised, he would have seen that all tins was not only allowed but stated, We have insisted that causation and law are to be found in the weather, and that there is nothing "arbitrary " in any department of nature. We have fortunately referred to the regularity of the trade winds (p. 101), arid have declared (p. 91) that " meteorology promises to be exalted into a science by late discoveries." We have admitted too (p. 174), that there is "great room, as knowledge increases, at once for advancing foresight and action." But alongside of this class of facts we have placed another which we reckon of no less importance, though they are often overlooked by scientific men. We have shown that there is a complication in nature which constitutes as remarkable a peculiarity of its structure as its uniformity, and that this complexity imposes limits on human foresight and sagacity, and renders man dependent on arrangements which have been made by a Higher Power. In regard to the regularity of the weather, Admiral Fitzroy, in his " Weather Book," tells us that, by combining barometric observations telegraphed from various places, he can say what the '*probable* character of the weather will be to-morrow or the clay

after." He allows that the prediction is " liable to be occasionally, though rarely, marred by an unexpected *downrush* of southerly wind, or by a rapid electrical action," and that he avoids " minute or special details, such as showers at particular places, or merely local squalls." But though the weather were to become the subject of strict science and prediction, nay, though it were removed out of the class of complicated into that of clear phenomena, the general doctrine of these sections would not be interfered with.